I’ve recently read (it’s not an authoritative source, so I can’t link, and this may all be wrong too) that the subcontractor company who implemented MCAS were unhappy about the specification they were being asked to work to that boeing had given them.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom apparently a lot of their programmers considered the quality level specified (i.E. Simplex sensor channels, no triplication, etc) inappropriate for the role and power that MCAS would actually have in flight.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom

Now I can only imagine what’s gone on between those programmers and their management, and the subcontractor’s management and their boeing customer.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom but I can well imagine that somewhere down the line the subcontractor has made very sure to have an email chain where their concerns were raised with boeing and boeing told them to proceed as per spec.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom

It does raise an interesting point though. As a subcontractor, if you’re being asked to do work that you know is dangerous you can’t just pass the buck back up the contract pathway to the customer.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom the fact that you have concerns means you also think that the customer is incompetent and can’t be trusted to act properly. By otherwise keeping quiet about it and doing as one was asked, you’re passing the buck but doing nothing to prevent loss of life.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom

The fact that they’re effectively (though unfairly) the focus of whole lot of very impatient and angry attention might be breeding a “conspiracy of optimism” within the company over the proposed fix, born out of desperation to escape the nightmare situation they’re in.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom the new spec as talked about by boeing certainly sounds better than the old one, but is it enough? I think they might be in “it’ll work this time, won’t it?” mode.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom that what you naturally think when you’re trapped in a nasty engineering corner.

Fly by wire and their software are there to aid and also ensure that the planer do not exceed their flight envelope that it is certificated for not to cover up a flaw in the design of the aircraft.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom airbus utilizes the fly by wire concept for a long time and they are improved over time making the aircraft safer and aiding flight crew to diagnose and assist if something unexpected should happen.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom read up the airbus A380 flight QF32 on the 4th. November 2010 when an engine exploded. The brilliant flight crew aided by the fly by wire system brought the damaged super jumbo safely back to changi airport in singapore not creating a situation where it took over control from the pilot!!!!Cognitive learning theory in the classroom

Before the boeing max is recertificated, FAA, EASA, CASA, TCGC and and all other authorities should look at the underlying purpose of MCAS and the issue they are dealing with.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom deal and insist that the underlying issue must be resolved by design and not using the software to cover the issue and pass the plane as safe because it is not.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom hypothetically, if a car is designed with a faulty brake system, you do not design a software to keep applying the brakes without letting the driver know when they sense a failure without warning.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom the owners and retailers were not informed of this feature in their cars. Whose fault is it when an accident happens and what should be done?Cognitive learning theory in the classroom answer this and the same solution should be applied to the boeing 737 MAX MCAS. System.

Correct me if I’m wrong, but I don’t recall dehavilland, mcdonnell, douglas, lockheed or martin ever being labelled as “unfit” to produce aircraft.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom yes, they made engineering mistakes, more understandable in those primitive (sorry) days. But as far as I’m aware none were as a result of management *preventing* engineers and test pilots doing their jobs on a *widespread* basis.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom however, this seems to be what has been going on inside boeing, if the allegations and revelations are sustained.

So that’s a long list of trouble for boeing to address.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom the problem as I see it is that the EASA, CAAC can read the press as well as you and I, so they will probably be having to assume that all of these revelations and allegations (any single one of which can be a killer) must be investigated and settled before they’re willing to accept assurances of airworthiness again.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom

Though practically, how does this mass of revelations and allegations get objectively assessed by the EASA, CAAC and everyone else who isn’t boeing and the FAA?Cognitive learning theory in the classroom are we to see EASA personnel having confidential chats with boeing staff? How about CAAC personnel poking their noses inside aircraft as they’re being assembled?Cognitive learning theory in the classroom and so on. What if they conclude one thing and the FAA concludes the other? It’s ghastly to consider.

@matthew: I totally agree with your remarks.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom with my knowledge and experience the FAA is supposed to be the independent authority entrusted with the task of certification but I am appalled and disillusion to know now that the FAA has practically handed the certification to personal employed, paid and reporting to boeing !!!!!Cognitive learning theory in the classroom the trust of the FAA and boeing is now questionable. Self certification is no certification !!! To rebuild the trust and that takes time, FAA must be reformed whereby aircraft manufacturers like boeing should and must not be doing self certification.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom congress should make sure that this is done so that the FAA is independent from the manufacturers and not pass regulations allowing the FAA to practically hand over certification to the manufacturers with the excuses that they do not have the expertise and manpower.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom funding will have to be allocated to the FAA to employ people with the expertise and impose regular training to keep the staff involved updated with any and all new technologies.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom the staff are the tools of the FAA and if they do not have the tools they are not functioning and no point them existing.

A fully staffed regulator with 100% oversight would have a lot of talented people who are mostly doing nothing.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom there simply isn’t enough aircraft development to inspect to keep them busy. The commonly held view is that that’s just not sustainable. Though I’d like to point out that such a view is subjective; it is sustainable if we (the human race) decide that it should be, and then we would make the necessary resources available.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom

Back to reality… there’s no going back to the halcyon days of a fully independent regulator. We’re stuck with a model where regulatory oversight is, at least to some extent, a company function.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom the regulator then should become an unimpeachable check and balance on the company’s management whilst retaining enough technical expertise of its own to oversee the company’s engineers.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom

Whether that model works comes down to what the company management thinks of regulatory oversight. An enlightened company will see strong adherence to regulatory processes as being a market growth factor (because that’s the truth).Cognitive learning theory in the classroom an unenlightened company will see regulations as an overhead cost to be minimised by all possible means. Unchecked, they will crash aircraft and kill people.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom

My view is that a regulator in today’s environment needs to be empowered to shut down a whole company without having to justify such action to anyone but themselves (not even the courts).Cognitive learning theory in the classroom they need a bigger stick than they currently have. That makes the regulators pretty powerful, and prone to corruption, so there should be a standing role in the police force to poke their noses into the regulator’s staff’s financial affairs.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom

For the record, all the *former* (I know no current staff) airbus engineers I’ve spoken to had no hesitation in saying that their management had had a healthy attitude to regulation.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom if an engineer insisted that, yes, something had to be done because it really was a regulatory / safety thing (and not just a “nice to have”), then it got done without any problems.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom ok, that’s a limited insight, but airbus’s senior management are right now probably very relieved that that’s the company culture they’ve got.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom

I remember when flying boeing was a source of pride and wonder. This was the company that made modern aviation—737 (first flight ever), 747-400 (first international flight), 777 (first flight as adult).Cognitive learning theory in the classroom nowadays I look forward to airbus flights more. A320 is superior to 737, A350 is superior to 787. In fact after one flight on 9-abreast 787 I won’t fly it again: seats so narrow that I had to keep one shoulder blade up the whole time unless I wanted a fight with my neighbor.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom A350 at 18 inches is the absolute minimum though still not as good as old 777s or 747s (from memory, maybe I was skinnier then). I have always wanted to ask: what happened to 787?Cognitive learning theory in the classroom did airlines make it 9-abreast because it came in over-budget and airlines couldn’t make it work at 8-abreast at the price boeing charges? It was advertised as 8-abreast, setting standards for comfort.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom instead it became a plane to avoid (also 10-abreast 777, I don’t believe with the 4 inch sidewall carve 777-8/9 will be much better).

Please don’t flame me or make this about boeing vs.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom airbus. As I said I loved the boeing of joe sutter and have great memories and respect for it. I’m just wondering if the 737 gaffe is about more than a technical mishap: a fundamental change in corporate culture, strategy and goals that means the days of boeing as a standard-setter and industry-leader are over for good.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom

If there was one area where stonecipher’s straight-talk-express routine was needed most, it was facing up to what had long been boeing’s terrible secret: the assembly lines of america’s leading exporter were morasses of inefficiency.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom airplanes were built more like customized houses, with airlines able to select from 109 shades of white paint, 20,000 galley and lavatory arrangements, and even curtained prayer rooms with devices that pointed to mecca (“mecca meters”).Cognitive learning theory in the classroom overseeing it all was an appalling system known as “effectivity,” which dated from boeing’s world war II bomber days and used a manual numbering system to keep track of an airplane’s four million parts and 170 miles of wiring; changing a part on a 737’s landing gear thus meant renumbering 464 pages of drawings.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom yes, there had been attempts at automation, but by the early ’90s they had metastasized into 450 separate computer systems, few of which could talk to one another.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom

Bad as that sounds, it gets worse. When a part wasn’t assigned the right number–which happened on roughly 30% of drawings–a special class of worker known as an “expediter” would often be sent, sometimes by bicycle, to fetch a spare from elsewhere in the plant.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom this “just-in-case” inventory management meant that factory floors were covered with huge tubs of spare parts worth millions of dollars; when someone saw the bottom of the tub, a new one would be ordered.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom “man, I had no idea how bad [the systems] were,” says stonecipher.

Sorry charlie- the mecca bit was a special airplane for a saudi- a one off- not a production airplane.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom as to the takeover- while boeing ‘paid’ to buyout MDC, the management takeover was factual- it affected all areas- company secretay, senior aero types, beancounters, etc.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom of course BA management at the time also screwed up by dumping about 9000 oldeer employees via a special retirement program a bit before harry and pals were on the scene.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom that resulted in the first unplanned shutdown of assembly lines since the founding of boeing. In the aerodynamics group, the MDC takeover resulted in a massive cost overrun of a new wing for 737- since the MDC types wanted to use the infamous inboard trailing edge wedge ( as used on the dc-10-11 to correct a range deficiency… then the stonechipher types pushed for the hiring of rudy deleon to try to push the 767 tanker game in 2000- which a year later in 2001-after 911- resulted in a proposal of building a 767 ‘ tanker ‘ frame in everett, flying it to wichita – taking it apart to convert to a real tanker, etc.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom jacked up the price/lease arrangement, and eventually resulted in club fed time for a few execs. Plus stealing documents, etc. And the boeing company has gone downhill ever since in terms of ethics, schedules, quality, and common sense.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom thus the 777 was essentially the last properly done boeing airplane-on time and on schedule and with minimum overruns.

So if you don’t have an answer about how fundamental issues are to be addressed and confidence rebuilt, a firm belief in a positive outcome simply becomes a form of religious dogma.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom I guess if you have devoted your professional life to analyzing boeing, you have no real choice but to stay on the bandwagon and hope it can dig itself out of the mud.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom

As a long time seattle area resident who claims no expertise on aviation issues, my oversimplified view is that the 737max episode mainly demonstrates that the foul legacy of the st.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom louis bean counters has yet to be extirpated. Boeing was built by puget sound engineers and machinists under the guidance of a management team that appreciated their contributions.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom after the merger the integrity of that culture was undercut under stonecipher, and it was then fully destroyed by mcnerney, who cared for nothing except the praise of wall street, detested the manufacturing employees and removed the headquarters to chicago so he wouldn’t have to deal directly with them.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom muilenberg may have pulled the company back from the worst of mcnerney’s excesses, but not enough has changed to really matter.

Based on that summary world view, boeing’s recovery seems far from assured.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom the company is regarded to have cut corners on a critical safety system. Worse, it is a safety system that was necessitated by an inherently risky decision to retrofit larger engines onto an existing body.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom that may have been defensible from an engineering standpoint, but boeing should have understood that any failures due to the retrofit would be impossible to defend to a skeptical public.Cognitive learning theory in the classroom the safety system should have been overengineered to eliminate even the slightest exposure to a failure risk.